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This study investigated moral judgment in children with high-functioning autism and their cooperation in
prisoner’s dilemma game with partners of different moralities. Thirty-eight 6- to 12-year-old
high-functioning autistic (HFA) children and 31 typically developing (TD) children were recruited.
Children were asked to judge story protagonists’ morality. After making this moral judgment correctly, they
were asked to play with the morally nice and the morally naughty child in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma
game. Results showed that both HFA and TD children made correct moral judgments, and that HFA
children might even have more rigid criteria for what constitutes morally naughty acts. HFA children’s
cooperation did not differ depending on the morality of the interaction partner, while TD children showed
higher cooperation when interacting with the morally nice than the morally naughty child did. Thus,
partner’s morality did influence TD children’s but not HFA children’s subsequent cooperation.
A
utism is a neurobiological disorder that is characterized by deficits in social interaction, impairments in
communication and language, restricted/repetitive behaviors and/or interests (DSM-IV). Lack of respon-
sivity to social emotional cues or reciprocal engagement is commonly seen as a main characteristic of
individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD)1. Clinical research argues that children with autism lack
empathic behavioral responses2,3. Studies have shown that children with autism have social-emotional deficits
and are inclined to use cognitive strategies to decode emotions in others4. Even individuals with high functioning
autism (HFA)have deficits in the cognitive and affective components of empathy5: HFAs have difficulties with
passing false belief tasks, that is in recognizing that another person’s belief might be different from their own and
from actual reality6. HFAs also show great difficulties with recognizing the expressions of emotion in others7 and
in perceiving behavior as emotionally expressive8. Successfully passing false belief tests and recognizing emotions
in others requires cognitive empathy, specifically theory of mind (ToM).
Moral judgment, that is the ability to judge one’s own and others’ behavior as right or wrong, is considered to be
closely related to ToM, as it is necessary to understand others’ beliefs, desires, and intentions to make proper
moral judgments9. At least by middle childhood, normally developing individuals pay more attention to a
person’s intention behind an action than to the outcome of the action when they evaluate the moral permissibility
of the action. This ability to focus on others’ intentions depends on ToM10.
In addition, empathy is typically considered as a necessary component of developing moral agents11. Empathy
may play at least two roles in the development of moral agency: (i) empathic ability might be helpful to learn
important moral lessons; (ii) empathic responses to harm suffered by a victim might be important in shaping
moral judgments to wrong-doing12. Furthermore, empathic capacity is useful in understanding who is judged to
be a victim of moral transgression13.
Moral judgment, as an important aspect of social functioning, has rarely been studied in research on autism13,
even though individuals with ASD have difficulties in processing mental state information (such as belief and
intention) and show deficits in their empathic capacities. Findings on whether the moral judgment of individuals
with ASD is different from normally developing individuals have been mixed so far. Moran, et al.14 found that
ASD individuals, who were impaired in social functioning(including empathy),judged accidental and intentional
harm as morally similar. This suggests that ASD adults had difficulties in integrating mental state information in
their moral judgments. Leslie, et al.13 found that autistic children behaved similarly to normally developing
children in their basic moral judgment. In their study, children were asked to judge whether the protagonist
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whether the protagonist should be rewarded or punished. Similar to
normally developing children, children with autism performed
appropriately to story type, that is they judged naughty acts as
naughty and nice acts as nice.
Moreover, the distinction between moral and conventional rules
and violations is considered critical in moral development15: Moral
transgressions have negative effects on others’ welfare and rights and
are wrong independent of the rules set by adults or other authorities.
Social conventions, in contrast, are context-specific and rather arbit-
rary agreements that help to coordinate people’s activities and inter-
actions in social systems and organizations (e.g., schools, work
places, groups) and are upheld by authority or social expectations16.
Blair17 found that, just like normally developing children, children
with ASD were able to distinguish between moral and conventional
violations, despite their deficit in ToM. However, Feng and Su18
found that Chinese children with autism had difficulties in making
moral judgment due to their deficits in ToM, but they performed
similar to normally developing children in their conventional judg-
ments. Grant, et al.19 found that, similar to control participants,
children with autism judged a moral transgression based on its
motivation and believed that an action harming another person
should be punished more than an action that caused damage to
property.
While autistic children’s moral judgment might differ in some
respects from those of normally developing children, few studies
have investigated how their moral judgments affect their own moral
behavior. Do children with autism exhibit different moral behavior
towards people they judge as morally nice versus those they judge as
morally naughty? The current study examined this question in more
detail.
Children’s abstract moral reasoning about agents in hypothetical
stories is closely related to their daily prosocial behavior20,21.
Furthermore, children’s own moral and prosocial actions are affected
by the recipient’s moral character or his or her previous (moral or
immoral) behavior. For example, Olson and Spelke22 found that 3.5-
year-old normally developing children allocated more resources to a
doll who was generous towards the participants or a doll who was
described as generally generous than to non-generous dolls.
Similarly, Kenward and Dahl23 showed that 4.5-year-old children
distributed more resources to a puppet that had previously helped
than a puppet that had previously hindered another puppet. Thus,
these studies indicate that judgments of the moral deservingness of
others affect the resource allocations of normally developing chil-
dren. As discussed above, autistic children behaved similar to norm-
ally developing children when they make moral judgment about
nice/naughty actions and whether to reward/punish those actions13.
In this study, we tested the very basic distinction between ‘‘nice’’
and ‘‘naughty’’. Moral judgments are not simply about what is
naughty but also about what is nice24. We tested children with
HFA on both antisocial and prosocial acts to determine whether they
could make both kinds of moral judgments correctly compared to
typically developing (TD) children. After making moral judgments
properly, participants were asked to interact with protagonists,
whom they judged as either nice or naughty before, in the prisoner’s
dilemma game (PDG). While Downs and Smith8 found that high-
functioning children with autism show similar cooperative social
behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma game as TD children, partici-
pants with HFA cooperate to a different degree with a human or
computer partner25. This indicates that the identity of the opponent
matters for HFA’s cooperative choices25. In this study, we bring these
two lines of research together to assess whether their judgments
about their interaction partner’s morality influences cooperation in
children with HFA and normally developing children in prisoner’s
dilemma game.
Based on the findings byLeslie, et al.13, we hypothesized that HFA
children would correctly judge others as morally nice or naughty in
the moral stories, similar to typically developing children. However,
because of their difficulties with understanding others’ intentions,
HFA children might exhibit similar cooperative behavior when they
were partnered with people they judged as morally nice and naughty.
In contrast, in line with earlier research22,23, we expected that norm-
ally developing children would cooperate more with a partner they
evaluated as morally nice than a partner they evaluated as morally
naughty.
Results
Empathy. The Empathy Quotient Child (EQ-C) questionnaire26, based
on parent report, was adopted to measure all 38 HFA children’s and 30
of the 31 TD children’s empathic ability. An independent-sample t-test
showed a significant difference in empathic ability between HFA and
TD children, t (47) 5 8.01, p 5 0.00 (MHFA 5 14.50, SDHFA 5 5.72,
MTD 5 29.53, SDTD 5 8.53).
Children’s moral judgment. Thirty-five of the 38 HFA children and
all 31 TD children completed the moral judgment task. In the
naughty condition, 35 HFA children chose ‘‘naughty’’ on the good/
naughty question, while 30 TD children chose ‘‘naughty’’, with the
remaining 1 TD children choosing ‘‘just ok’’, as shown in Figure 1.
An independent sample t-test showed that HFA children judged
harming others as significantly morally worse than TD children
did (t (57) 5 2.57, p 5 0.01 , 0.05; MHFA 5 1.74, SD 5 0.44, MTD
5 1.42, SD 5 0.56). Thus, both HFA children and TD children could
judge other’s morality correctly in naughty condition, and HFA
children might even have more rigid criteria for morally judging
harming a victim.
In the nice condition, two HFA children chose ‘‘just ok’’ and ‘‘a
little naughty’’ respectively. These two HFA children were not asked
to continue with the PDG. Children’s moral judgment in the nice
condition is shown in Figure 2. Both HFA children and TD children
could judge others’ morality correctly in the nice condition. There
was no significant difference in judgment of other’s morality between
HFA children and TD children in the nice condition (t (63) 5 0.25, p
5 0.80 . 0.05; MHFA 5 1.65, SD 5 0.54, MTD 5 1.61, SD 5 0.56).
Children’s cooperation when interacting with partners of
different morality. HFA children and TD children were both
asked to play with partners of different morality in the PDG to
examine whether they would perform differently when they
interacted with morally nice or with morally naughty people.
Seven HFA children did not complete the PDG because they could
not understand the rules of the game (the two HFA children who did
not properly judge the story characters’ morality were included in
Figure 1 | described HFA children’s and TD children’s moral judgment
in naughty condition story. Both HFA children and TD children could
judge other’s morality correctly in naughty condition, and HFA children
might even have more rigid criteria for harm to the victim.
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these seven HFA children). Accordingly, 31 HFA children (25 boys, 6
girls) interacted with morally nice or naughty partners in the PDG.
Thirty-one TD children, who were matched in age and gender to
HFA children, also completed the PDG. A cooperative response was
recorded as 1 point and non-cooperative response was recorded as 0
points. Since ten rounds of PDG were played per interaction partner,
scores could range from 0 (no cooperation in all ten games) to 10 (full
cooperation in all ten games). HFA and TD children’s cooperation
when they interacted with partners of different moralities and the
random stranger are shown in Table 1.
The difference between children’s cooperative response and a ran-
dom level of cooperation (5) was examined using one-sample t-test,
shown in Table 1. HFA children cooperated significantly less than
the random level when they played with a naughty child, but not
different from the random level when they played with the nice child.
TD children did not cooperate differently with the random level
when they interacted with the naughty child but showed significantly
higher than random cooperation when they played with the nice
child.
In order to examine the effect of partner’s morality on children’s
cooperation, comparison between their performance when they
played with nice/naughty child and performance when they played
with the random stranger was tested using a repeated-measures
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). HFA children cooperated similarly
with different kinds of partner, F (2, 90) 5 1.89, p 5 0.16. Further
post hoc multiple comparison showed that HFA children’s coopera-
tion was marginally higher when they were partnered with a nice
child than when they were partnered with a naughty child (p 5 0.06),
but their cooperation with a random stranger was not significantly
different from cooperating with either a naughty or a nice child. In
contrast, TD children showed significantly different cooperative
behavior when they were partnered with the three different kinds
of players, F (2, 90) 5 4.13, p 5 0.02. Further post hoc multiple
comparison showed that TD children’s cooperation was significantly
higher when they were partnered with a nice child than when they
were partnered with a random stranger (p 5 0.02), or with a naughty
child (p 5 0.02). There was no significant difference in cooperation
between playing with a naughty child and playing with a random
stranger (p 5 1.00).
In addition, a paired-sample t-test was adopted to compare chil-
dren’s mean payoff after 10 rounds when playing with either a
naughty child or nice child. It was found that there was no significant
difference in HFA children, t (30) 5 –1.60, p 5 0.12, whereas, TD
children’s mean payoff was significantly higher when interacting
with a nice child than when interacting with a naughty child, t (30)
5 –2.52, p 5 0.02.
The percentage of choosing a cooperative responses when HFA
and TD children played with the nice child and the naughty child
across the 10 rounds of the PDG is shown in Figure 3. A repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted to measure children’s cooperation
when they played with partners of different morality with the
between-subject-variable Group (HFA children, TD children), the
within-subject variable round, and the covariate control variable IQ.
The main effect of Group was not significant when participants
played with the naughty child, F (1, 61) 5 2.68, p 5 0.11, g2 5
0.04, while it was significant when participants played with the nice
child, F (1, 61) 5 5.97, p 5 0.02, g2 5 0.09. HFA children showed
similar cooperation levels as TD children when they played with the
naughty child, but showed significantly lower cooperation than TD
children when they played with the nice child.
The main effect of round was neither significant in the case of
playing with the naughty child (F (9, 61) 5 0.960, p 5 0.47, g2 5
0.02) nor when playing with the nice child (F (9, 61) 5 1.28, p 5 0.25,
g2 5 0.02). However, further analysis showed that when they played
with the naughty child, HFA children performed differently in the 10
rounds of the game, F (9, 30) 5 2.30, p 5 0.02 , 0.05, g2 5 0.07. Post
hoc multiple comparisons showed that HFA children’s cooperation
was significantly lower in the first and third round than that in the
fourth and fifth round, and lower in the third round than that in the
eighth round, while higher in the fifth round than that in the ninth
and tenth round. TD children did not perform significantly differ-
ently across the10 rounds of the game, F (9, 30) 5 1.01, p 5 0.43, g2 5
0.03. When they played with the nice child, neither the HFA children
nor the TD performed significantly differently across the 10 rounds
(HFA children: F (9, 30) 5 1.69, p 5 0.09, g2 5 0.06; TD children: F
(9, 30) 5 0.48, p 5 0.89, g2 5 0.02). No further significant main or
interaction effects emerged.
Discussion
This study had two main aims: First, to examine whether HFA chil-
dren could make correct moral judgments, similar to TD children;
and second, whether an interaction partner’s morality affected coop-
eration in HFA and TD children. Concerning the first aim, both HFA
Figure 2 | described HFA children’s and TD children’s moral judgment
in nice condition story. Both HFA children and TD children could also
judge other’s morality correctly in nice condition. There was no significant
difference in judgment of other’s nice morality between HFA children and
TD children.
Table 1 | Children’s cooperative behavior in PDG with different kinds of partner
Children groups Mean SD




HFA children Playing with naughty child 4.29 1.79 –2.204 0.035 0.509
Playing with nice child 5.13 2.06 0.349 0.730 0.214
Playing with random stranger 4.58 1.21 1.938 0.062
TD children Playing with naughty child 5.13 2.19 0.329 0.745 1.000
Playing with nice child 6.39 1.96 3.938 0.000 0.015
Playing with random stranger 5.13 1.80 0.399 0.693
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children and TD children could make moral judgment correctly in
this study, consistent withLeslie, et al.13. Thus, following these
authors and others(e.g., Grant, et al.19), HFA children seemed to have
little difficulty in evaluating certain acts (such as hitting and sharing)
in terms of their morality. On the contrary, HFA children judged
harming others as significantly worse than TD children. This indi-
cates that HFA children might have more rigid criteria for what
constitutes morally naughty actions. This might be because HFA
children are more rule-oriented when it comes to certain behavior
because of their disorder. For example, stereotypy, compulsive beha-
vior, sameness, ritualistic behavior, repetitive or restricted behavior
have been associated as part of the diagnosis of autism27. Thus, HFA
children might also be more rule-oriented when it comes to moral
actions. Similarly, Baron-Cohen28 argued that although autistic indi-
viduals are typically self-focused, they are highly moral people, have a
strong sense of justice, and think deeply about how to be good.
While HFA children can correctly judge the morality of nice and
naughty acts, being partnered with persons of different morality did
not change their level of cooperation. Furthermore, HFA children’s
cooperation was not different when they played with a random
stranger, compared with when they played with the nice child or
with the naughty child. On the other hand, TD children cooperated
more when they played with the nice child than that when they
played with the naughty child or the random stranger. These latter
findings are in line with previous research22,23 which shows that,
beginning in the preschool years, TD children take into account their
interaction partners’ previous moral behavior when deciding
whether to act prosocially.
HFA children essentially focus on their own self, and have lower
empathic abilities than normally developing children3. While some
HFA children show empathy with others and overcome their self-
focus, this takes great cognitive effort28. Being less interested in others
and the world outside their own might lead to HFA paying little
attention to partner’s morality when they play in the PDG, even they
had an idea about the morality of the partner. Thus, HFA children’s
cooperative performance was not influenced by partner’s morality,
although they could correctly judge others’ morality in basic moral
judgment stories.
In addition, differences in peer experience between HFA children
and TD children might also contribute to finding that TD children
show different levels of cooperation with different partners while
HFA children do not. HFA children have difficulties in social ini-
tiation and social-emotional understanding, but are not insensitive to
social stimuli, as they were as likely to interact socially with peers29.
Autistic children are in a vicious circle of social isolation. On the one
hand, they want to interact with peers and to express the feelings of
disappointment and loneliness in the absence of interaction. On the
other hand, they do not know how to properly interact with peers due
to their limited capacity and experience of social and emotional
understanding30. Children with autism have poor experiences in
interacting with peer group in daily life, which might make HFA
children show similar levels of cooperation in experimental situa-
tions (such as the prisoner’s dilemma game) when they played with
partner of different morality. In contrast, TD children make many
friends and accumulate rich experiences to get along with peers in
elementary school, at which stage it is important to develop friend-
ships31. Moreover, attention to moral principles, such as norm and
promise32, becomes an important feature of friendships and peer
relations33. Therefore, TD children might be more likely to take into
account their partners’ characters, including their morality, com-
pared with HFA children.
Furthermore, HFA children also have deficits in reciprocal peer
interaction and social cognition. They perform more ritualized beha-
vior and less social interactive behavior (such as prosocial behavior).
Moreover, the social interactive behavior performed by autistic chil-
dren is only to maintain similarity but not to share emotion and
experience with peers29. Peer interactions provide opportunities to
initiate and maintain prosocial behavior with individuals of similar
power and status. In these relationships children learn the principles
of reciprocity and open communication34. Children develop a deep
understanding about moral identity by thinking about moral events
from different perspectives. Moreover, peers are able to provide
warm and powerful resources, which is an important ingredient of
prosocial behavior. Peers also give feedback by providing reward and
punishment to promote and diminish moral and prosocial behavior.
Peers and the experiences based on interacting with peers are import-
ant to children’s prosocial behavior, trust and intimacy, which are
produced through reciprocal prosocial behavior and, are the founda-
tion of the development of positive morals34. Peers and peer relation-
ship are important to the development of children’s prosocial
behavior35,36. HFA children’s deficiency in peer relationship might
lead them to perform indiscriminate cooperation when playing with
the naughty and the nice partner in the current study.
In addition, HFA children have typically deficits in social function,
based on their impairments in ToM and empathy, although they
have normal IQ. Empathy is important for children’s development
of moral judgment, prosocial behaviors, and social competence37.
The strong relationship between moral judgment and ToM is also
confirmed by neuroimaging evidence10,38,39. Furthermore, the rela-
tionship between theory of mind and cooperation has also been
shown through behavioral evidence40 and neuroimaging41–43. Thus,
HFA children’s deficits in social functioning might lead them to
Figure 3 | described the percentage of choosing cooperative responses when HFA and TD children played with nice child and naughty child across the
10 rounds of the PDG.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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perform similar cooperation when they interacted with partners of
different moralities in prisoner’s dilemma game, although they could
judge other’s morality correctly.
Some limitations of the current study should be acknowledged.
Firstly, while HFA and TD children were matched on age, gender,
and IQ; differences in children’s verbal ability were not controlled
for. Future research should measure HFA children’s language ability
before examining their social behavior. Secondly, although the aut-
istic children in this study were evaluated by the expert clinician
based on DSM-IV criteria and their diagnosis was confirmed by
other multiple clinical evaluation (see details in Method section),
their diagnosis was not confirmed by the Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule (ADOS). Future research should use this more
standardized clinical instrument to ensure a research-quality dia-
gnosis. In addition, more sophisticated moral judgments should be
used further in the future. For example, since HFA children might
have particular difficulties with understanding others’ intentions
moral judgments based on others’ intentions and cooperation with
well- and ill-intended partners might be an interesting direction for
future studies.
Overall, this study found that both HFA children and TD children
could make correct moral judgments, and HFA children might have
even more rigid criteria for what constitutes a ‘‘naughty’’ act than TD
children. HFA children’s cooperation was similar when they played
with partners of different moralities, while TD children showed
higher cooperation when they played with a morally nice child than
that when they interacted with a naughty child. Therefore, HFA
children’s cooperation was not influenced by partner’s morality,
while TD children’s cooperation might be prompted by partner’s
nice morality. This study thus gives an important insight into
high-functioning autistic children’s moral judgment and moral
behavior.
Methods
Participants. Thirty-eight children with autism aged between 6 to 12 years (MAge 5
9.59, SD 5 2.29, 30 boys and 8 girls) were recruited. The gender ratio was nearly 451,
which is similar to previous research44. All of the participants were diagnosed by
professional hospitals according to the autism diagnostic criteria specified in the
DSM-IV. All participants’ performance on the Autism Behavior Checklist (ABC) and
Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) reached the cut-off score for autism.
Moreover, HFA children’s performance on the Autism Spectrum Quotient -
Children’s Version45 also reached the cut-off score of 76. Participants’ IQ was tested
with the standardized Raven test46. Autistic children’s IQ was between 70 and 144,
with an average of 110, indicating that they were HFA children.
As only 31 of the 38 HFA children completed the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG,
see below), 31 TD children were also recruited, who were matched to the HFA
children based on their age and gender. TD children’s IQ was also tested using the
standardized Raven test and ranged between 83 and 130, with an average of 113.
There was no significant difference between the two groups of children in terms of IQ,
t (67) 5 –0.774, p 5 0.442.
Materials and procedure. Moral judgment task. Each child was told two moral
stories13, and was asked whether the protagonist in the story was a nice or naughty
child. Participants were introduced to a response scale and were trained to use it
before formal testing. The response scale showed three stars at one end of a line, and
three Xs at the other end. Children were told that the stars meant that something was
‘‘really nice,’’ and the Xs meant that something was ‘‘really naughty.’’ A black circle in
the middle of the scale indicated that something was ‘‘just ok.’’ A single star and a
single X, which meant ‘‘a little nice’’ and ‘‘a little naughty’’, respectively, were at points
in between the midpoint and the two extremes. After the scale was explained to them,
children were asked to show how much they liked various items, such as ice cream,
spinach, and water, by pointing to the appropriate point on the scale.
Children were told both the ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘naughty’’ moral story in counterbalanced
order. For the naughty story, children were first introduced to the story protagonists
(illustrated with dolls) and then told the harm story:
‘‘Today teacher Wang’s class has an exciting activity. Everyone gets to pick a special
toy. Lele fortunately gets to pick a toy first, and he/she picks a stuffed monkey. It
makes Mingming angry, because Mingming also wants to have the stuffed monkey.
Mingming hits Lele in the arm and this makes Lele very sad, and Lele starts to cry’’.
Children were then asked two questions:
Nice/naughty question: ‘‘Was it nice, naughty, or just okay that Mingming hit
Lele?’’
Response scale: ‘‘Show me how nice or naughty it was on the Scale’’.
In the nice condition, children were also first introduced to the story protagonists
(illustrated with dolls), and then they were told the kindness story:
‘‘Today Miss Wang’s class is eating. Lele has no candy. This makes Lele very sad
and Lele starts to cry. This is Junjun, and Junjun has two pieces of candy. Junjun
shares his/her candy with Lele. This makes Lele very happy, and Lele starts to laugh’’.
Children were then asked two questions:
Nice/naughty question: ‘‘Was it nice, naughty, or just okay that Junjun shares
candy with Lele?’’
Response scale: ‘‘Show me how nice or naughty it was on the Scale.’’
Cooperative task. The classic prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) was adopted to
investigate children’s cooperative behavior. There were 10 rounds in all in each
condition. To make sure that HFA children were able to understand the rules of game,
the matrix of payoffs in PDG was simplified in this study, as shown in Table 2.The
shape # was adopted to represent the choice for cooperation, while the shape D
represented the choice for competition. Geometric shapes were chosen to avoid the
influence of the semantic meaning of the words ‘‘cooperation’’ and ‘‘competition’’ for
HFA and TD children. Children were asked to play the game with a random stranger,
who was the experimenter’s confederate.
Participants were first introduced to the two cards, # and D, and were told that s/
he and the partner needed to freely select one of the cards in each round and show the
selected card to each other simultaneously after hearing a sound signal. Then the
experimenter explained the payoff of choices to children and emphasized that their
payoff was determined by the choice of both sides. Children were also asked to record
their own and partner’s choices and payoffs on paper after each round so they could
get feedback and understand their choices deeply. Child-friendly language was used
to make children, especially autistic children, understand how to play the games.
To make sure that children with autism had understood the rules of game, a
practice trial was conducted before the actual game. Children were asked which
payoffs they could get after making certain choices. The actual game only started after
they correctly answered this payoff question for three times in a row. If they could not
answer correctly, the rules of the game were repeated. If after three times, they still
could not pass the practice questions, the game was stopped. The total payoffs chil-
dren and the partner got were calculated at the end of each condition. The partner
always adopted the tit-for-tat strategy: S/he chose to cooperate in the first round of the
game, but in the following rounds chose the strategy that had been adopted by the
partner in the preceding round. After playing all the games, children were given gifts
as real payoff.
After children judged protagonists’ morality correctly in the moral judgment tasks,
they were asked to interact with three protagonists (a nice child and a naughty child
from the story) in PDG in counterbalanced order. Only children who could correctly
judge the protagonists’ morality in the moral stories were asked to interact with a
morally nice or naughty protagonist in PDG. In addition, all children were asked to
play PDG with a random stranger, the experimenter’s confederate, whose morality
was not known to participants. Children’s cooperative behavior in this neutral con-
dition was used as a baseline. In each condition, children interacted with the same
partner (nice child, naughty child, or the random stranger) for ten times.
The ethics committee in Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, had
approved our experiments. Informed consent forms for children’s parents had been
obtained from all subjects and methods were carried out in accordance with the
approved guidelines.
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